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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
sufficiently authenticated by the photographer or an eyewitness of the events
recorded.12 But motion pictures supply additional opportunities for the
exercise of judicial discretion. A court may exclude motion pictures on the
grounds that their projection would be inconvenient,13 or that they would
provide merely a spectacular repetition of matters already in evidence. 14
The court may also require expert testimony to the effect that the films
will be projected at the exact speed at which they were taken.15
The cases suggest a question of procedure: Should a lower court view
motion pictures before passing on their admissibility? The instant case
implies, logically, that when the party offering the evidence discloses facts
which make the films inadmissible, the court can exercise its discretion
without looking at the pictures. However, it would seem desirable that a
court inspect proffered films before admitting or rejecting them when coun-
sel fails to reveal disqualifying information. Irrevocable harm might be
done if the court, in reliance on information furnished by the attorney
offering the films, should permit the jury to see inadmissible pictures. An
instruction to disregard could hardly eradicate from the minds of the jurors
the vivid impression created by moving, pictorial representations.
T. B.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - INTERPLEADER - DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP -
[United States].-To determine conflicting rights to stock and dividends, a
Washington corporation interpleaded citizens of Washington and of Idaho
in a federal district court in Washington. The property involved was de-
posited with the court. For jurisdiction the Federal Interpleader Act'
requires "* * * two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different states
* * *." The question of jurisdiction was first raised by the Supreme Court
on its own initiative. Held, that the real controversy was between the ad-
Ins. Co. v. Stossel (1938) 131 Fla. 127, 179 So. 163; State for Use of Chima
v. United Rys. & Elec. Co. (1932) 162 Md. 404, 159 Atl. 916, 83 A. L. R.
1307; Rogers v. Detroit (1939) 289 Mich. 86, 286 N. W. 167; Common-
wealth v. Roller (1930) 100 Pa. Super. 125.
11. Morris v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (Mo. 1940) Unreported;
Pandolfo v. United States (C. C. A. 7, 1922) 286 Fed. 8.
12. Heiman v. Market St. Ry. (1937) 21 Cal. App. (2d) 311, 69 P. (2d)
178; De Camp v. United States (App. D. C. 1926) 10 F. (2d) 984; Gulf
Life Ins. Co. v. Stossel (1938) 131 Fla. 127, 179 So. 163; Rogers v. Detroit
(1939) 289 Mich. 86, 286 N. W. 167; Commonwealth v. Roller (1930) 100
Pa. Super. 125.
13. State for Use of Chima v. United Rys. & Elec. Co. (1932) 162 Md.
404, 159 Atl. 916, 83 A. L. R. 1307; Boyarsky v. Zimmerman Corp. (1934)
240 App. Div. 361, 270 N. Y. S. 134.
14. Boyarsky v. Zimmerman Corp. (1934) 240 App. Div. 361, 270
N. Y. S. 134. See De Camp v. United States (App. D. C. 1926) 10 F. (2d)
984.
15. See State for Use of Chima v. United Rys. & Elec. Co. (1932) 162
Md. 404, 159 Atl. 916, 83 A. L. R. 1307; Commonwealth v. Roller (1930)
100 Pa. Super. 125.
1. Act of January 20, 1936, 49 Stat. 1096, (1939 Supp.) 28 U. S. C. A. sec.
41(26).
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verse claimants, who were of diverse citizenship and therefore the dis-
trict court had jurisdiction.2
The rule was early established in Strawbridge v. Curtiss3 that for diver-
sity jurisdiction to exist under the general statute4 the citizenship of all
parties on one side must be adverse to all on the other side. Some exceptions,
however, exist.5 The rule of that case was based upon the particular statute
and did not mean that Congress might-not constitutionally extend jurisdic-
tion in other situations. The instant case, Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
is the first in which the Supreme Court has construed the diversity clause of
the Interpleader Act. By this decision the term "claimants" is in effect inter-
preted as "respondents," and jurisdiction exists when they are themselves
citizens of different states although the interpleader is a resident of the
same state as one of the claimants. Using symbolic form for comparison
with other type situations, and with letters representing different states in
which the parties may reside, the Treinies case may be symbolized: A. vs A2
and B. When the same situation has been presented in lower federal courts,
the result has been the same.0 This result seems desirable since an inter-
pleader can seldom secure relief in state courts because of inability to secure
service of process upon absent non-residents; 7 nor, without the interpreta-
tion adopted by the Tr'einies case, would the problem of process limitations
be remedied by the Act.
The instant case, however, leaves unanswered other interpleader prob-
lems. If a situation be represented as A vs. B. and B2, does the Tr'einies case
mean that federal courts are without jurisdiction? There are lower court
cases taking jurisdiction based on the diversity of citizenship existing be-
tween interpleader and claimants. 8 These cases could not have been rested
2. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 44.
3. (U. S. 1806) 3 Cranch 267.
4. Judicial Code, sec. 24, (1927) 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 41(1).
5. E. g., suits by representative parties and ancillary proceedings. See
Dobie, Federal Procedure (1928) secs. 64, 84.
6. Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1937) 91 F. (2d)
141 (construing 1926 Interpleader Act, 44 Stat. 416, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 41
(26), in which language as to citizenship is the same as the 1936 Act); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Cross (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 130 (1926
Act); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lott (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1921) 275 Fed. 365
(1917 Interpleader Act-modified by the 1926 Act); Ackerman v. Tobin
(C. C. A. 8, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 541 (1926 Act); Allen v. Hudson (C. C. A. 8,
1929) 35 F. (2d) 330 (1926 Act); non-statutory case, Von Herberg v.
Seattle (C. C. A. 9, 1928) 27 F. (2d) 457. Cf. Eagle Star & British Domin-
ions v. Tadlock (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 933, reversed by Security
Trust & Savings Bank v. Walsh (C. C. A. 9, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 481.
7. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy (1916) 241 U. S. 518, holding inter-
pleader to be a proceeding in personam.
8. Mallers v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 87 F. (2d)
233; Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Meguire (D. C. W. D. Ky. 1936) 13 F. Supp.
967; Turman Oil Co. v. Lathrop (D. C. N. D. Okla. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 870,
Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Walsh (C. C. A. 9, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 481.
See also Dee v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 813;
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanders (C. C. A. 5, 1930) 38 F. (2d) 212; Callo-
way v. Miles (C. C. A. 6, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 14; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bon-
durant (C. C. A. 6, 1928) 27 F. (2d) 464; Klaber v. Maryland Casualty Co.
(C. C. A. 8, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 934.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss3/8
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
on the Act which provides for diversity of citizenship between adverse claim-
ants. But lower courts have said that the common law right of interpleader
still exists and was only supplemented by the Act.9 If this be true, it would
seem that the jurisdictional amount would be in excess of $3000, as provided
under the general statute,"D rather than $500 under the Interpleader Act.
The courts have not as yet determined this point. Under this interpreta-
tion federal courts would have jurisdiction both in situation A. vs. A2 and B,
as a matter of interpretation of the Act, and in situation A vs. B. and B 2,
as a matter of common law jurisdiction. If the aim be to give the inter-
pleader a remedy in the federal courts when relief is impossible in the
state courts," this result also seems sound. The Court in the Treinies case
recognized the problem in this situation, but declined to determine whether
decisions of lower federal courts were inconsistent with its decision. 12 An-
other decision of the Supreme Court will be necessary to solve this problem.
Another possibility may be symbolized as A vs. B1, B, and C, involving
diversity between B. and B. on the one hand and C on the other, but not
as between B, and B2 themselves. If the Act means that all claimants
must be of diverse citizenship, then in this situation an interpleader is with-
out relief in a state court because of limitations of process, and also outside
federal jurisdiction. But if the Act properly means that only two claimants
must be of diverse citizenship, then relief may still be secured in the
federal courts. This view has been taken in a number of lower court
decisions."3
In review of the apparent need for liberal construction of interpleader
statutes, it is hoped that in time the law may be definitely settled that
federal jurisdiction will extend to all three types of situations herein
set out.' 4
W. A. D.
9. See, for example, Mallers v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (C. C. A. 7,
1936) 87 F. (2d) 233, 235.
10. Judicial Code, sec. 24, (1927) 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 41 (1).
11. See Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (1936) 45 Yale
L. J. 963, 975.
12. The Court in a judge's note in the Treinies case said: "We do not
determine whether the ruling here is inconsistent with the conclusion in
those cases where jurisdiction was rested on diversity of citizenship between
the applicant and cocitizens who are claimants." 60 S. Ct. 44, 48.
13. Lowther v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 3, 1922) 278 Fed. 405;
Ackerman v. Tobin (C. C. A. 8, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 541; Cramer v. Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 141; Railway Express
Agency v. Jones (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 341; Ross v. International
Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1928) 24 F. (2d) 345; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Reid (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 502; Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co.
v. Brown (D. C. W. D. La. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 164. The point was left open
in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lott (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1921) 275 Fed. 365; non-
statutory, Turman Oil Co. v. Lathrop (D. C. N. D. Okla. 1934) 8 F. Supp.
870.
14. For discussion of the problems presented herein, see Chafee, Inter-
pleader in the United States Court (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 1134, 1141-1143,
1165-1169; Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (1936) 45 Yale
L. J. 963, 973-976.
19401
Washington University Open Scholarship
